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Introduction1
Terrorism has become an international phenomenon (cf. Schneckener, 2006): terrorists
operate in not just one but many different countries, the terrorist threat is no longer per-
ceived by citizens and politicians as being nationally bounded but as a global issue
(Beck, 1999; Borgeson and Valeri, 2008; Mu¨ller, 2008), and the geographical scope
of anti-terrorist measures has expanded (Mu¨nkler, 2005).
Terrorist action can be defined as the intentional use of physical force by non-state actors
against ‘soft targets’ such as ‘civilians’ (cf. Townshend, 2002: 11; Tuman, 2003), but it is
more than an act of violence. It also has to be understood as a ‘communication strategy in
which messages are sent in a spectacular way’ (Mu¨nkler, 2005: 177)2 to elites and popula-
tions. The distribution of these messages depends strongly onmass media, which extend the
reach of terrorism far beyond the city or country in which an attack has been carried out and
makes the inherent threat perceptible to a broader audience (Fuchs, 2004: 79). The extent and
thenature ofmedia constructions are, therefore, significant catalysts of terrorist events.Mass
media draw attention to certain attacks and present them in specific ways (cf.Weimann and
Brosius, 1991), make them appear relevant to citizens (Borgeson and Valeri, 2008: 128),
may influence individual and institutional decisionmaking (cf. Oates, 2006), and contribute
to the (de)legitimation of certain political movements (cf. Scheufele et al., 2005).
Within the media landscape, television plays a particularly important role, as it is
widespread and commonly used in many countries (cf. Hans-Bredow-Institut, 2009;
IP International Marketing Committee, 2008). Furthermore, due to its audio-visual char-
acter and the possibility of live reporting, it can provide timely and (supposedly) realistic
depictions of terrorist events (Hoffman, 2007: 276).
The aim of this study is to investigate the specifics of mass media representations of ter-
rorism.We analyze these specifics in a comparative study because it enables us to determine
the specific domestic features of such representations. Since international terrorism has
been interpreted and structured primarily in terms of the ongoing conflict between the Arab
and ‘Western’ worlds (cf. Rapoport, 2006), we examine news broadcasts from both sides of
this alleged conflict: the ‘EveningNews’ of the US service of CNN, ‘HasadAl Yaum’ from
Al Jazeera’s Arabic service, the ‘Ten O’clock News’ from British BBC One and the
‘Tagesschau’ of German public broadcaster ARD. In doing so, wewill go beyond the exist-
ing literature on terrorism coverage which consists primarily of case studies of individual
countries (cf. Cohen-Almagor, 2005;Woods, 2007) and only a handful of comparative stud-
ies (cf. Oates, 2006; Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2008). By including Al Jazeera,
we extend the scope of our analysis beyond the commonly investigated ‘Western’ context.
Moreover, we do not analyze print media, as is frequently done elsewhere (cf. Altheide,
2006; Schaefer, 2003), because their significance often remains limited, especially in
regions with high rates of illiteracy. Instead, we focus on TV coverage, i.e., on probably the
most relevant medium for a comparative analysis of terrorism coverage.
Theoretical framework
There are different theories in communication and social sciences as to whether and to
what extent the reporting of different TV channels in different countries might be similar
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or along which lines they might differ. From these assumptions, three theorems can be
drawn which we will use as heuristics to guide the interpretation of our analysis.3
Country-specific reporting
Some scholars assume that media coverage is mainly influenced by national contexts.
Accordingly, coverage would be expected to vary considerably from country to country.
The domestic factors influencing media reporting have been systematized by Shoemaker
and Reese (1995) as well as Weischenberg (1992, 1995), in a model of concentric circles
of influence on media coverage. The outer circle consists of a country’s historical and
cultural characteristics which may differ according to national traditions of journalism
(Esser, 1998: 25), geographical or linguistic particularities (Thomaß, 2007: 23), religious
differences (Hafez, 2005a: 148), or the differing value systems of political elites (cf.
Bennett, 2009; Bennett et al., 2006). The next layers of influence consist of country-
specific structural, institutional and organizational characteristics such as economic fac-
tors, technological influences (Weischenberg, 1992: 249, 1995: 13) or typical working
processes in newsrooms (Esser, 1998: 26). In the inner circle, we find socio-
demographic characteristics, attitudes, self-perceptions and motivations of journalists
(Esser, 1998: 26). It is assumed that the characteristics and relevance of these factors
vary from country to country, and that coverage on external or transnational issues, such
as international terrorism, is molded by them into a specific, domestic view (Swanson,
2003: 57). This model corresponds with the significant country differences that have
been shown in media coverage on issues like abortion (Ferree et al., 2002), biotechnol-
ogy (Scha¨fer, 2007) or European Union enlargement (e.g. Wimmel, 2006).
Regional patterns in reporting
Other scholars suggest that cross-national variance may be subordinate to regional dif-
ferences in media reporting. Two variants of this perspective can be distinguished.
(a) In line with the structural pattern of contemporary terrorism, which is often per-
petrated by Arab Islamists against ‘Western’ victims, some scholars expect the strongest
differences between the coverage in Western and Arab media. Most often, these assump-
tions are rooted in alleged cultural differences or, in turn, similarities. Some scholars
draw on Samuel Huntington’s controversial thesis of a ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ (1998,
for critical accounts see Bantimaroudis and Kampanellou, 2007; Barber, 1995) to under-
line their claims. Huntington has posited that the 21st century world is characterized by
opposing ‘‘cultures,’’ especially by the conflict between the Christian-dominated
‘‘West’’ with the US as its ‘‘core’’ state, and the ‘‘Islam’’ residing primarily in the Arab
world. He argues that this conflict finds its expression, among other aspects, in the public
rejection or devaluation of the other side (Huntington, 1998: 345); and accordingly, dif-
ferences between ‘‘Western’’ and Arab media reporting might be expected (cf. Seib,
2004: esp. 79 ff.). Coming from an entirely different theoretical background, research
on the role of cultural proximity in media reporting leads to similar assumptions: it has
been argued that cultural proximity functions as a news value, i.e. meaning that cultu-
rally proximate issues and aspects are more likely to be taken up and highlighted by
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journalists (see Galtung and Ruge, 1965), and that similar preferences can be found
among culturally similar audience members (Ksiazek and Webster, 2008). These the-
ories, similar to Huntington in this respect, lead to assumed differences in terrorism cov-
erage between Western and Arab media. Comparative studies have indeed found such
differences and mutual stereotyping, for instance in media coverage on the September
11 attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the ‘‘image of Islam’’ in Western media, or
inversely in the presentation of the ‘‘West’’ in Arab media (cf. Abrahamian, 2003; Aday
et al., 2005; Hafez and Richter, 2007; Jasperson and El-Kikhia, 2003). While some scho-
lars explain differences between Western and Arab media with cultural factors, others
suggest that similar differences can be ascribed to differences in the respective media
system. Comparative media systems’ analyses show clear differences between Western
and Arab countries. While western media systems are classified as liberal (like the US)
or socially responsible and public service-oriented (like the UK or Germany, Blum, 2005
and Siebert et al., 1963), Arab media systems are seen as more authoritarian (Rugh,
2007; Selber and Ghanem, 2004) even if they are currently undergoing rapid change and
differ from each other internally (cf. Iskandar, 2007; Rugh, 2007).
(b) Regional differences in coverage may also be assumed because the analyzed coun-
tries and regions are involved in crucial conflicts to different degrees. It has been argued
that a part of a journalists’ profession is to provide a ‘‘national outlook’’ (Nossek, 2004:
349), so that nationally significant events tend to be discussed in more detail. News value
theory provides a simple explanation for this phenomenon, and empirical studies show
that terrorist events are interpreted by journalists as more or less ‘newsworthy’ and cov-
ered accordingly (Kelly and Mitchell, 1981; Weimann and Brosius, 1991). Nossek’s the-
sis that the interpretation of a terrorist event as ‘‘ours’’ or ‘‘theirs’’ influences its media
representation (2004, 2008) fits well into this theory (for a similar account see Nacos,
2007). Accordingly, it can be assumed that differences between groups of countries need
not (only) be culturally determined, but that the participation of countries in specific con-
flicts will also be reflected in media coverage. Since contemporary terrorism is fueled by
the conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and because countries like the US, UK,
and Germany are involved to different degrees in these conflicts, this can be expected to
affect their coverage.
Global standardization of coverage
In contrast to theories emphasizing country or regional differences in media coverage,
many scholars emphasize the similarities among media constructions worldwide, and
relate these to globalization (cf. critical: Hafez, 2005b; Herman and McChesney, 2000;
Luhmann, 1997; Thompson, 2000). Partly as a result of an ‘‘increase in formal and
informal communication links that connect the international, national and regional
news media with each other’’ (Swanson, 2003: 69), it has been argued that a ‘‘transna-
tional news culture’’ (Cohen et al., 1990: 44), a ‘‘global newsroom’’ (Gurevitch and
Levy, 1990; Gurevitch et al., 1991) or a ‘‘global news system’’ (Swanson, 2003: 69)
can be found nowadays. This global standardization is seen to be particularly strong
in visual media such as television, which overcome spatial and temporal boundaries
more easily than print media (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 56; Lo¨ffelholz and Hepp,
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2002: 15), and in reporting about ‘global problems’ (Krotz, 2005: 34) such as climate
change (Ivanova et al., ; Schmidt et al., 2013) or international terrorism which are glob-
ally relevant (cf. Beck, 1999).
In the case of terrorism coverage, several authors have demonstrated how such simi-
larities manifest themselves: Norris et al. (2003) argue that a worldwide normative
assessment has been established with regard to terrorism: attacks are to be rejected by
political elites almost everywhere, even by (former) leaders of countries like Libya,
Syria, and Iran which, according to intelligence services, may be secretly supportive
of terrorism (cf. Townshend, 2002: 12; Tuman, 2003: 6). Norris et al. argue that the con-
demnation of terrorism has become part of a ‘global script,’ in the sense of Meyer (2005)
that has to be supported – at least officially – by all nation states and expressed by the
United Nations in several resolutions (cf. UN General Assembly, 2006: 3). Norris and
colleagues go on to assume that this script would also be characteristic for media cover-
age, in which the portrayal of terrorism would then become standardized across countries
and, thus, a ‘‘one-sided’’ case’ (Norris et al., 2003: 12). The attacks and their perpetrators
are condemned and compassion is shown for the victims. The assumed connection
between media coverage and the views of political elites corresponds to Bennett’s Index-
ing Theory (1990; see also Robinson, 2001). In times of international conflict, he argues,
the constellation of actors in the media environment, especially the positioning of polit-
ical elites, plays a particularly large role in shaping the coverage (see also Altheide,
2006; Oates, 2006). Accordingly, a consensus among elites about the importance and the
evaluation of a subject would strongly be reflected in the media. In turn, when political
elites were divided, this would lead to a pluralization of media positions. These findings
seem to be consistent with the US coverage of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Within the US political elites there was an initial consensus on the legitimacy of military
interventions resulting in a largely consistent portrayal across the range of US media. But
this consensus was not shared by the political elites of other countries, especially in the
Arab world. Accordingly, Jasperson and El-Kikhia (2003) found significant differences
between CNN and Al Jazeera in their evaluation and interpretation of the Afghanistan
war, and Aday et al. (2005) provide similar findings for coverage of the Iraq war.
Table 1 provides a summary of the different theories we have discussed. In the fol-
lowing sections, we will use them as means to interpret our empirical findings.
Data and methods: Analyzing the main news of CNN,
Al Jazeera, the BBC, and ARD
Data selection
The selection of our data followed a hierarchical logic. First, we decided to analyze tele-
vision coverage, as television is the most common and intensively used mass medium in
most countries around the world including Arab and Western countries (cf. Arab Statis-
tics, 2009; IP International Marketing Committee, 2008), and particularly so in extreme
events such as terrorism (Emmer et al., 2002: 169). Second, we chose TV broadcasters
which represent different countries and regions of the world, and which are relevant due
to their scope and impact: the US service of CNN, the pan-Arab station Al Jazeera
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(Qatar), BBC One (UK) and the German ARD (see table 2).4 Third, we analyzed the
main daily news programs of these channels, which are especially suited for comparative
analysis (Ro¨ssler, 2004: 271) as they have large audiences and are perceived as high quality,
informative and credible by most audience members (cf. Al Jazeera, 2009; Office of Com-
munications, 2008: 51; Pew Research Center, 2004; Zubayr and Geese, 2009).
We investigated these channels’ coverage of four terrorist attacks. In line with our
conceptual framework, we selected incidents in Madrid, London, Amman, and Sharm
El Sheikh (see Table 3), i.e., attacks in both Western and Arab countries that involved
primarily Western and primarily Arab victims, as well as attacks on locals and foreign-
ers. All of these took place within a relatively short period of time, in 2004 and 2005.
Data analysis
Up to 7 days of coverage following the attacks were included in our analysis. De facto,
87 news shows and 658 individual news segments were investigated using a combination
of qualitative and quantitative content analyses.5
The quantitative content analysis covered the basic features of the analyzed footage,
such as the date and length of transmission, and format.6 It also covered the importance
given to an event by the broadcasters, the weight assigned to the event in relation to oth-
ers (placement within the transmission, scope, etc.), and how the event was evaluated.
Finally, we assessed how the victims (the number of the dead and injured, how many
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of these were shown in the images, as well as their gender, occupation, origin, and reli-
gion) and perpetrators (including their motives and objectives) were portrayed.
All news items were then analyzed qualitatively. This step – similar to many variants
of qualitative research – aimed to condense and structure the source material (in the form
of text and images) in terms of the research questions and theoretical assumptions (cf.
Mayring, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The analysis was
an iterative process of data interpretation, category formation, relating categories to new
material and categories, etc. (cf. Strauss, 1987). In this respect, Mayring (1994) distin-
guishes between summarizing, contextualization, and structuring of the material. Our
approach is based on Mayring’s method and will be specified in the following.
After transcribing the characteristics of the broadcasts in terms of language, sound, ima-
gery, and technical details (choice of camera angles, etc.), the first analytical step was the
creation of a basic protocol for each broadcaster and each day. Early in the project, these
protocols were created by the entire research group of five. Later, they were written by one
team member and subsequently reviewed, possibly corrected, and edited by a second
member. Deductively (on the basis of research questions) and inductively (based on the
qualitative coding of the coverage), the following categories were established as being use-
ful for the description of coverage: (i) significance (the presented importance of the event),
(ii) evaluation (how is the event evaluated?), (iii) victims (which victims of the attack are
depicted and how?), (iv) perpetrators (which perpetrators are depicted and how?), (v)
motives and objectives (how are the motives and targets of the perpetrators described?),
(vi) reactions (what kinds of reactions to the event are shown and how?), and (vii) emo-
tional representations (what emotions are represented and how?).
In a second step, synthesis protocols were written. The aim was to create a typological
structure for the information contained in the basic protocols. In this process,
broadcaster-specific and event-specific interpretations were added and cross-links and
Table 2. Overview of the selected broadcasters and their news programs.a
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News
program
‘‘Evening News’’ ‘‘Hasad Al Yaum’’ ‘‘Ten O’clock
News’’
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aThe data were compiled on the basis of Al-Awsat (2006), IP International Marketing Committee (2008:
177, 435, 438, 462 f.), Lynch (2006: 45), Pew Research Center (2004, 2005, 2006), and Zubayr and Gerhard
(2009: 103).
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comparisons were integrated into the protocols. In turn, the amount of supporting mate-
rials such as quotations and images was reduced to typical examples. As with the basic
protocols, the synthesis protocols were structured in terms of the dimensions described
above, but adding a category in which the key interpretative pattern of a given terrorist
incident was established. We tried to determine these underlying organizing ideas or pat-
terns in ‘‘frames’’ (cf. Jasperson and El-Kikhia, 2003; Liebes and First, 2003; Norris
et al., 2003; Schaefer, 2003) that were generated inductively; using the seven analytical
dimensions described above in which one can often see a broadcaster’s typical manner of
representing a given attack. These frames are specific configurations of how the terrorist
events were portrayed, what causal interpretations were provided, what moral evalua-
tions were used, and what treatment recommendations were given – mirroring the
dimensions of framing outlined by Entman (1993).
In a first step, the team member who had written the basic protocol of a channel’s foo-
tage on a specific attack compiled the respective synthesis protocol. It was then corrected
and adjusted by another team member who had previously watched the respective broad-
casts. Discrepancies in interpretation between the two team members were resolved with
recourse to the original broadcast and/or discussed with the entire research team. All
established synthetic protocols were discussed by the entire research group afterwards
and, if necessary, modified and supplemented. Discrepancies were again resolved with
recourse to the material.
In total, 16 synthesis protocols were created for the analysis (four terrorist events cov-
ered by each of the four broadcasters). Each group member was involved at all stages of
the process. The research group consisted of social scientists with competences in meth-
odology, political communication, and comparative research, as well as necessary cul-
tural competences for which purpose an Iraqi, a researcher trained in Arab studies,
and another in American studies took part.
Results
Key similarities and differences between the analyzed TV stations will be presented
along three dimensions: first, we will describe the significance that was assigned to the
analyzed four terrorist incidents by the media – ‘agenda setting’ research shows, after all,
that the significance with which an event is depicted in the mass media is reflected in the
perceptions of the recipients (e.g. Hasebrink, 2006). Second, we will reconstruct the way
in which the broadcasters depict the perpetrators and victims. Third, we will show how
the events are framed.
Similarities across all channels: Terrorism as significant and ‘‘one-sided’’
The first main finding of our study is that the terrorism coverage of CNN, Al Jazeera, the
BBC, and ARD show considerable similarities. These become clear, first of all, in the
broadcasters’ attribution of importance to the individual terrorist attacks. All channels
devote almost identical amounts of attention to the four attacks. Despite the large number
of terrorist attacks globally – the Rand Corporation database (2009) points to 2723
attacks between 1999 and 2008 – the four broadcasters portray the London, Madrid, and
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Sharm el Sheikh bombings on the same number of days within the first week, with the
Amman bombing being the only visible deviation (see Table 4). Likewise, the amount of
airtime devoted to these incidents and their placement within the news programs also
show strong similarities.
The evaluation of the attacks – the ‘‘moral evaluation’’ component of media frames
(Entman, 1993: 52) – was almost identical across all broadcasters. They clearly condemn
the attacks and emphasize the illegitimacy of terrorism, even if the broadcasters – as we
will discuss later – differ in the strength of their condemnation. These negative evaluations
are manifested, first, in rhetoric: attacks and perpetrators are described as ‘‘brutal’’ (BBC, 8
July 2005), ‘‘barbaric’’ (Al Jazeera, 8 July 2005),7 ‘‘hateful’’ or ‘‘criminal’’ (ARD, 7 July
2005, 10 July 2005), ‘‘insane’’ (CNN, 12November 2005), and ‘‘atrocity’’ and ‘‘shocking’’
(BBC, 10 November 2005). Underlining these negative evaluations is a second feature
used by all broadcasters and for all events: high-ranking individuals and commentators,
such as US President GeorgeWBush, British PrimeMinister Tony Blair, UNGeneral Sec-
retary Kofi Annan or Jordan King Abdullah II, condemn the act. Third, the illegitimacy of
the attacks is stressed further by highlighting the innocence of the victims and by represent-
ing them as uninvolved politically, militarily, and economically, i.e., as civilians who,
regardless of religion or ethnicity, deserve sympathy. For example, the BBC highlights the
‘‘simple Londoners’’ (7 July 2005) that were attacked, and that in Amman, ‘‘innocent life’’
(BBC, 10 November 2005) and ‘‘innocent civilians’’ (Kofi Annan, ARD, 11 November
2005) were hurt or killed. Al Jazeera declares that the ‘‘attacks [in Amman] made no dis-
tinction between people with different political positions or betweenmen, women and chil-
dren’’ (11 November 2005).8 Finally, a fourth stylistic device is found across all stations:
the juxtaposition of carefree everyday individual victims before the deed with their pain
and suffering caused by the attacks, which underlines the negative evaluation of the
attacks. This is most evident in the presentation of the attacks in Amman, where all stations
reported on a wedding that was ended violently by the suicide bombings. Showing footage
of the happy couple taken immediately before the attack, and contrasting this with the
destroyed scene afterwards, CNN commenced its ‘‘Evening News’’ broadcast on the day
of the attack in this way: ‘‘We begin tonight with a strong and simple lesson in terror. Ter-
ror has a wedding celebration transformed into a blood bath’’ (9 November 2005). The
other stations also used this technique: ‘‘Five minutes after the start of the celebration all
that was white is red’’ (Al Jazeera, 11 November 2005); ‘‘The party was going well. [ . . . ]
This is Ashraf El Haled and his bride with their fathers – two proud men who were about to
die’’ (BBC, 10 November 2005); or ‘‘They were just celebrating as the first explosive
device went off’’ (ARD, 10 November 2005). A similar portrayal was visible with regard
Table 4. Number of days on which the attacks were covered by the four broadcasters.
CNN Al Jazeera BBC ARD
London 6 7 7 7
Madrid 6 7 6 7
Amman 6 6 3 3
Sharm El Sheikh 3 4 4 4
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to the London bombings, where the Londoners’ joy about being awarded the 2012 Olym-
pic Games was contrasted with their shock about the bombings which followed shortly
thereafter.
Differences in coverage: The interpretive framework
Apart from these similarities, however, there are also differences between the analyzed
media. For example, even though the victims of the attacks are portrayed similarly on all
channels, there are differences in the frequency of this representation. Similarly, the perpe-
trators and their motives, as well as possible or expected reactions to the acts, appear to dif-
ferent extents in the analyzed news shows. Such differences can be found in the basic
definition of the terrorist incidents – or as the framing literature would say, in the ‘‘problem
definition’’ – aswell as its ‘‘causal interpretation’’ and the respective ‘‘treatment recommen-
dations’’ (see Entman, 1993: 52 ff.). As we will see, there are even some, albeit small dif-
ferences to be found in the ‘‘moral evaluation’’ dimensions. Overall, these varying
emphases give rise to two different frames which are used by two broadcasters each.
The ‘‘war on terror’’ frame of CNN and Al Jazeera. CNN and Al Jazeera differ from the other
channels in their interpretation of the attacks. They portray them as an expression of a
geopolitical conflict in which the liberal Western democratic societies under US leader-
ship on the one hand are confronted with transnationally organized Islamist terror net-
works, particularly Al Qaeda, on the other (cf. Reese and Lewis, 2009).
This interpretive framework becomes obvious through the choice of words and pic-
tures: both broadcasters use explicit and often warlike vocabulary to describe the conflict
and visualize the events with scenes from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars such as moving
tanks or other military equipment. They also argue that countries like Britain and Jordan
have become targets of terrorist attacks because they are ‘‘staunch American allies’’
(CNN, 9 November 2005; Al Jazeera, 7 July 2005). They do not interpret the attacks
in local, regional, or national terms, but within a global context and often visualize this
by using a world map of international terrorism or ‘‘modern war’’ – a stylistic device
used by both CNN and Al Jazeera.
Moreover, the geopolitical framing of the terrorist attacks is manifested in a specific
presentation of the victims, perpetrators, and overall reactions to the attacks. As mentioned
previously, the difference in the representation of the victims by CNN and Al Jazeera in
comparison to the other channels does not lie in the manner but in the extent of the victims’
portrayal – both CNN and Al Jazeera show pity for the victims and portray them as inno-
cent civilians but these representations are far less prominent than in the respective BBC or
ARD coverage. While the latter stations portray the fates of individual victims in length on
the first day of reporting on the London attacks, CNN and Al Jazeera only do so after a few
minutes of discussion of the perpetrators. This can also be substantiated quantitatively:
CNN and Al Jazeera depict victims in only a small percentage of their news segments
(2.3% and 4.2%, respectively), whereas the share for the BBC is 18.2% and for the ARD
33.3%. The proportions of news segments talking about the death tolls of the attacks are
similar (CNN 39.5%, Al Jazeera 48.3%, BBC 81.8%, ARD 66.7%).
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Instead, the perpetrators are focused on much stronger in CNN’s and Al Jazeera’s
coverage. The origin and group affiliation of the (alleged) terrorists is reported exten-
sively, as is speculation about their motives. Both on CNN and Al Jazeera, underlying
motives are linked mainly to British and US foreign policy, whose ‘‘hostile invasion’’
was met with ‘‘massive resistance’’ in Iraq, ‘‘bringing the battle field into the countries
that participated in the campaign’’ (Al Jazeera, 8 July 2005).
Finally, both CNN and Al Jazeera focus strongly on the consequences and reactions to
the attacks, and in doing so, pay less attention to domestic investigations, clean-ups or
rescue missions than on foreign policy reactions and, at times, military implications.
Again, the geopolitical situation structures the coverage. CNN has a more aggressive
style in which foreign policy preferences and options for military action are clear. The
question is: ‘‘what can be done to stop it from happening again’’ (CNN, 7 July 2005),
and George W Bush is quoted as saying: ‘‘In the face of such adversaries there is only
one course of action: We will continue to take the fight to the enemy. And we will fight
until this enemy is defeated!’’ (CNN, 11 July 2005). Al Jazeera, too, focuses mostly on
geopolitical responses to the attacks. For example, the channels news anchors and
experts discuss in detail how Tony Blair should be interpreted when he spoke of the need
to show strength and fight terrorism ‘‘from its roots’’ (Al Jazeera, 8 July 2005). This is
done cautiously and from a more defensive position but is often accompanied by fears of
sweeping and exaggerated reactions.
There are further sub-distinctions between CNN and Al Jazeera which go back to their
different evaluations of the geopolitical situation. With CNN, the legality of US actions
with respect to theWestern alliance and the illegitimacy of terrorist attacks are not drawn
into question. The attacks are condemned strongly (‘‘horror,’’ 7 July 2005; ‘‘carnage,’’ 9
July 2005; ‘‘insane,’’ 12 November 2005; ‘‘barbaric,’’ 9 November 2005; ‘‘diabolic,’’ 10
November 2005) and the perpetrators are described in pejorative words (Al Qaeda as a
‘‘hydra-headed movement,’’ 7 July 2005 and splinter groups as ‘‘cancer metastasis of Al
Qaeda,’’ 13 July 2005). CNN deals at length with the identification of the perpetrators
but not with individual offenders and their personal motives; instead they are rather inter-
ested in the ‘‘enemy’’ terrorist networks. Moreover, in describing them as ‘‘British-based
radical Muslims’’ (CNN, 7 September 2005) the CNN ‘classify’ the perpetrators not only
in terms of their nationality but also in terms of their religion. The quantitative analysis
reveals that in 30.2% of CNN’s reports on Amman the religion of the perpetrators is
mentioned (Al Jazeera 12.5%, BBC 18.2%, ARD 16.7%).
Altogether, Al Jazeera represents the perpetrators in as much detail as the CNN, but
does so differently: first, Al Jazeera devotes more airtime to the perpetrator’s own per-
spective. It also gives them an individual face by allowing people from their commu-
nities to speak, people who understand their backgrounds (‘‘What can you expect
from people who are persecuted and are constantly threatened with death? [They] are
constantly attacked with rockets, like in Falluja and Anbar,’’; 9 November 2005). Sec-
ond, Al Jazeera clearly distinguishes between the perpetrators and Muslims in general,
and stresses, for example, that ‘‘Many Muslims have condemned the attacks’’ (9 July
2005; see 8 July 2005). Third, in some cases Al Jazeera implicitly blames Western elites,
partly implicating them as co-culprits: Tony Blair and George W Bush, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, ‘‘acted mercilessly against an enemy’’ (Al Jazeera, 7 July 2005). This, it
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is argued, is reciprocated in the form of terrorism in Britain and the United States. Gen-
erally, however, Al Jazeera focuses more than other stations on the illegitimacy of the
foreign policy of the United States and its allies, which represents a failure (a ‘‘lost war,’’
8 July 2005, and ‘‘mistake,’’ 7 July 2005) and they speculate, for example, on whether
the British would withdraw their military from Iraq (10 July 2005).
In the presentation of the victims, several other specifics of Al Jazeera’s coverage can
be found. The channel is the only one that describes occasions where Muslims were vic-
tims of discrimination in the West. On the day of the London bombings, for example,
they claim that the ‘‘Arab council in London [had] received threatening letters from
strangers’’ and also ask: ‘‘Should one be worried about Arabs and Muslims in Britain?’’
(see 7 July 2005 and 13 July 2005). Similar statements can be found with respect to the
attacks in Amman: Al Jazeera stressed that events ‘‘again illustrated the situation of the
Palestinians. The wedding party [in the attacked hotel] was meant to reunite a family that
had been separated since the 1967 war. The wedding became a funeral’’ (Al Jazeera, 11
November 2005). The victims are thus framed as victims in a double sense: they are
shown to suffer under the Israeli occupation as well as from the attacks in Amman – sug-
gesting a shared guilt for Israel and the United States (cf. Seib, 2004: 80).
Overall, however, these differences are arranged into a frame of interpretation Al
Jazeera shares with CNN, Both interpret the attacks as expressions of a global political
conflict – one in which their constituencies are strongly involved and often seen as the
main conflict parties. In this way, they differ from the BBC and ARD.
‘‘Crimes against humanity’’ – the frame of the BBC and ARD. The geopolitical interpretation
of the terrorist attacks is considerably less pronounced in the coverage of the BBC and
ARD. Instead, the attacks tend to be interpreted as criminal acts, with the conflict parties
not being national governments and transnational terrorist organizations, but individual
perpetrators and their victims which represent a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.
This interpretive framework is manifested primarily in the fact that the representation
of victims by the BBC and ARD is the most important reporting dimension in terms of
length and placement. The detailed representation of the individual life-worlds of vic-
tims, which can be seen to some extent across all events, is clearly the central focus for
the BBC and ARD. This is complemented by numerous references to the various ethni-
cities and religions to which the victims belong (‘‘black and white, Muslim and Chris-
tian, Hindu and Jew, young and old,’’ BBC, 7 July 2005, and ‘‘all colors, all races, all
religions,’’ ARD, 11 July 2005). On several occasions, both channels also show ethni-
cally diverse groups or crowds mourning. Altogether, this presentation suggests that the
attacks struck a cosmopolitan civil society or even the entire ‘‘human civilization’’
(ARD, 10 July 2005).
In contrast, the representation of the perpetrators receives very little attention and dif-
fers strongly from that of the CNN and Al Jazeera. The BBC and ARD are very careful
about potential prejudice in their identification of the perpetrators. While both mention
parallels between earlier Al Qaeda attacks and the London bombings, for example, they
consistently point out that the authenticity of two letters of responsibility is yet to be pro-
ven. Throughout the broadcasts, they carefully choose their words. The broadcasters rely
on information provided by official agencies of the government, but do not assert their
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own positions (‘‘the BND claims that there is every indication that this is an attack with
an Islamic background,’’ ARD, 7 July 2005). They also sometimes present contradictory
statements without taking a definite position, such as ‘the police do not currently have
concrete evidence of the perpetrators. Tony Blair, however, is clear: ‘‘We know that
these people act in the name of Islam’’’ (ARD, 7 July 2005). Furthermore, both broad-
casters clearly distinguish between the perpetrators and other Muslims, noting, for exam-
ple, that ‘‘the overwhelming majority of Muslims here and abroad are honest and law
abiding people which abhor this kind of terrorism just as we do’’ (ARD, 7 July 2005).
This rather ‘civil’ (and less geopolitical) interpretation of the BBC and ARD is also
manifested in the fact that the political motives of the perpetrators are less often men-
tioned and are less speculated upon. The hotels destroyed in the attacks on Amman, for
example, are described as ‘‘big hotels’’ (BBC, 11 November 2005) or ‘‘luxury hotels’’
(ARD, 13 November 2005), and not as ‘‘American owned’’ (CNN, 9 November 2005)
or hotels which are primarily frequented by Israeli tourists (Al Jazeera, 12 November
2005). In turn, the motives of the perpetrators remain rather vague in the coverage by
the BBC and ARD – it is merely understood as an assault by a few extremists on ‘‘civi-
lization’’ (ARD, 11 March 2004; 12 March 2004).
The same is true of the representation of the reactions to the attacks. The BBC and ARD
present some of the potential geopolitical implications of the events, but do so with care
and also focus much stronger on immediate local reactions such as rescue operations:
‘‘A large contingent of rescue forces were on the spot within a very short time. Support
to hundreds of injured went well, stakeholders and police say’’ or ‘‘shortly after the explo-
sions police began to evacuate the stations’’ (ARD, 7 July 2005; 8 July 2005). In addition,
the consequences of the attacks on people’s daily lives are presented in detail. Again and
again, the broadcasters refer to the fact that terrorism will not succeed – we ‘‘cannot allow
the perpetrators of violence, to destroy [British] society and values’’ (Tony Blair, ARD, 7
July 2005), ‘‘our way of life’’ will not change (Queen Elizabeth II, ARD, 8 July 2005), and
‘‘the terrorists will not bring us to our knees’’ (German Interior Minister Otto Schily, ARD,
8 July 2005). This mentality of resilience is also presented in the description of the ‘‘calm-
ness of the crowds’’ (BBC, 7 July 2005) and the ‘‘incredible peace and serenity’’ of Lon-
don (ARD, 7 July 2005). We see people on the day of the attacks who have to walk home
or brave overcrowded trains, ferries, roads, and hotels, struggling to accept their fate.
Calmly, ‘‘they want to send a message to the terrorists that life continues’’ (BBC, 8 July
2005). Moreover, the representation of a variety of expressions of solidarity and compas-
sion by citizens, journalists, and elites evokes the image of a shared identity: ‘‘The world’s
reaction is mainly one of sympathy, solidarity and condemnation [,] those bombings
brought civilized people closer together’’ (BBC, 11 July 2005).
Summary
Figure 1 summarizes the similarities and differences between the analyzed broadcasters
interpretative frameworks schematically. Our comparative analysis of TV news cover-
age has shown that, on the one hand, the reporting of terrorism in different countries and
regions has many similarities. CNN, Al Jazeera, the BBC, and ARD devote nearly iden-
tical amounts of attention to the four attacks, and the stylistic devices used to describe
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them are very similar regardless of where the events took place and regardless of the
location of the broadcaster. The evaluation of the actions of the perpetrators and the atti-
tude towards the victims are also similar across all four channels. The attacks are uni-
formly condemned, and the victims are presented as innocent civilians who were
unjustly injured or killed and deserve everybody’s sympathy. In this regard, all of the
channels underline the illegitimacy of the terrorist attacks. In this sense, we find a
cross-national standardization of terrorism coverage which corresponds to the theoretical
model of a ‘‘global standardization of coverage’’ outlined above.
On the other hand, we also found differences in the coverage. These lie mainly between
the CNN andAl Jazeera on the one hand – i.e., between the broadcasters whose countries or
regions are intensively involved in certain geopolitical conflicts – and theBBC andARDon
the other. The former interpret the attacks as an expression of a global ‘‘war on terror,’’
whereas the latter see themas criminal attacks bya few individuals against civilization itself.
Relating our findings to the theories presented at the beginning of the paper, the over-
all results paint a mixed picture. In addition to some cross-broadcaster similarities, we
find differences between CNN and Al Jazeera, on the one hand, and the BBC and ARD
on the other. Even though we cannot explain these differences systematically, we con-
sider factors outside the media to be the most important influences on terrorist coverage
and, thus, the described similarities and differences.
Overarching similarities
across all channels
Representation of the attacks as significant
Condemnation of the attacks
Condemnation of the perpetrators
Representation of the victims as innocent civilians
BBC and ARD:




CNN and Al Jazeera:
Frame ‘War on Terror’
















Figure 1. Similarities and differences in the representation of terrorism.
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First, the far-reaching similarities in evaluation may be due in large mainly to the con-
stellation of actors surrounding the media, especially to the political elites. A consensus in
the evaluation and interpretation of terrorism is likely to lead to similar media presenta-
tions – and in turn, differences between media will increase if elites are divided (e.g. Ben-
nett, 1990; Robinson, 2001). This is particularly true in conflicts, and particularly so in
international conflicts. In the case of terrorism, there is a strong consensus on the illegiti-
macy of terrorist attacks (Norris et al., 2003: 12), which is not confined to individual nation
states and not only to the ‘West’, but, at least officially, is supported throughout the world.
This can be understood as part of a world culture which is codified by the decisions of the
United Nations (cf. UN General Assembly, 2006: 3). Under these conditions, the mass
media’s evaluation of a topic can be expected to be largely uniform because there are
no high-status actors from outside the media who publicly approve of the terrorist acts.
The nuancing in the evaluations, which differs between Al Jazeera and other broadcas-
ters, could be explained as follows: under conditions of a hegemonic interpretation of
events, dissent must be concealed through indirect means of articulation. They would first
be formulated by actors of low social standing and are rarely expressed by large institutio-
nalized media outlets. Second, evaluations which diverge from the hegemonic opinion
shift to subtleties, to overtones and emphases. This is precisely what we found. Al Jazeera
gives the perpetrator’s perspective a little more time, discussing family background, the-
matizing more strongly the illegitimacy of the foreign policies of the US and its allies in
Iraq and Afghanistan or the Israel-Palestine conflict, and reporting on a second group of
victims –Muslims in theWest whowere targeted in thewake of the attacks. Thus, the neg-
ative assessment of the terrorist attacks, while extant, is mitigated slightly.
Nevertheless, the existence of such a consensus cannot account for the different
frames we found, i.e. why CNN and Al Jazeera interpret the events as a ‘‘war on terror,’’
while the BBC and ARD interpret them as ‘‘crimes against humanity.’’ We suspect that
these differences are due to country differences in the political landscape and in the posi-
tions of political elites in particular (Bennett, 1990; Nossek, 2004, 2008). The decisive
factor seems to be the extent to which political actors interpret the attacks as an expres-
sion of a conflict in which one’s own country is involved. In this respect, the stakeholders
from outside the media differ in their evaluations, which corresponds with the interpre-
tive framework that can be found in the mass media:
(a) In the US, the attacks of 11 September 2001 brought about a radical reorientation
of foreign policy towards the ‘‘war on terror.’’ At the same time, George W Bush
appealed to all countries to support this effort, and interpreted the absence of assistance
as an endorsement of terrorism: ‘‘Every nation [ . . . ] now has a decision to make. Either
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’’ (The White House, 2001). This bipolar
standpoint has led to changes in US foreign policy and also reoriented and reorganized
the national perception and interpretation of conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and else-
where. This has been shown for a number of US media in the past (e.g. Cook, 1994; Hal-
lin, 1994; Mermin, 1999) and corresponds with the dominant interpretative framework
of CNN.
(b) The German government’s position deviates markedly from the interpretation of
US foreign policy. Although the attacks of 11 September 2001 were strongly con-
demned, Germany did not become directly involved in the ‘war on terror,’ refusing, for
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example, to participate in the Iraq War. The interpretation of the threats as well as the
scope of foreign policy is much more moderate in German than US politics. Though
CNN’s interpretation of the examined events reflects official US policy, it seems that
ARD’s interpretive framework also takes its cue from German politics.
(c) The UK, in this respect, act ambivalent. On the one hand, the Blair government
was, after 11 September, the closest ally of the US and their foreign policy, participat-
ing in the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, there was a
growing and widespread social opposition across the UK which called attention to the
negative consequences and lack of legitimacy of the wars (Williams, 2004). This sit-
uation, Robinson (2001) claims, created a window of opportunity for the media to posi-
tion themselves. The BBC might well have used this opportunity in the cases we
analyzed: the British prime minister and his cabinet members are given a voice, the
attacks are not interpreted as an episode of the ‘‘war on terror,’’ but as ‘‘crimes against
humanity.’’ The broadcaster, therefore, reflects the position of the British population
more closely, which ranged from skeptical to critical of the Blair government’s foreign
policy stance.
(d) As a pan-Arab broadcaster, Al Jazeera cannot be assigned to any particular Arab
country, which makes reference to a specific constellation of policy difficult. However,
Al Jazeera has been characterized as critical towards Arab governments. This applies
both to Arab countries that are US allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, as well
as those who are more likely to be classified as opponents of US foreign policy like Syria
or Iran. In this situation, it can be assumed that Al Jazeera reflects less the positions of
certain Arab elites than, as Robinson (2001) suggests, its own unique position. As with
the BBC, Al Jazeera’s position has many parallels with the views of the Arab populations
of many countries – the so-called ‘‘Arab street’’ (Center for Strategic Studies, 2005;
Lynch, 2003).
Similarities and differences between broadcasters may not only be linked to constella-
tions of actors outside the media but also traced back to media-specific factors, even
though we think this is less plausible. In terms of journalistic cultures (‘‘journalistic prac-
tices, professional standards and ethical factors’’; for an overview see Hahn et al., 2008),
there are many similarities between the television stations we have analyzed (cf. Hanitzsch
and Seethaler, 2009; Ku¨ng-Shankleman, 2000; Miles, 2005). However, even if we con-
sider it plausible that external media factors can explain the described differences and simi-
larities better than media-specific differences, we are not able to prove this. This seems to
be a worthwhile goal for future studies in the field of terrorism studies.
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Notes
1. Both authors contributed equally to the text; their names were listed alphabetically. A detailed
description of the design, methodology and findings of the study as well as reports on other
dimensions can be found in Gerhards et al. (2011).
2. This quote, as well as several others from German books and articles, has been translated into
English for this publication.
3. We will not be able to ‘test’ them as terrorism coverage is determined by many factors;
in our analysis, we are able to track and control a few of them only, and must therefore
limit ourselves to the description of relatively few cases (cf. Lieberson, 1991). We will,
however, identify factors that might provide an explanation to our findings at the end of
the article.
4. Due to restrictions on availability of archival material, we were not able to include all the
broadcasters we were initially interested in. As a result, we were only able to include the
pan-Arab station Al Jazeera, rather than other Arab national broadcasters. We selected CNN
and Al Jazeera because, unlike BBC and ARD, they are not general entertainment channels
and broadcast only news. However, we analyzed only the main daily news programs of CNN
and Al Jazeera as we assume that the most important events of the day are summarized in
these broadcasts and which enables a comparison with the daily news programs of the general
broadcasters.
5. For acquisition of material we used the archives of the German public broadcasters and the
‘‘Mediathek’’ of the ARD, the ‘‘BBC Motion Gallery,’’ and the Television News Archive of
the Vanderbilt University in Nashville. The material from Al Jazeera was gathered while vis-
iting the station in Doha (Qatar).
6. The code book was based on conceptual considerations and classifications of other projects
(e.g. Haußecker, 2007; Unz et al., 2008; Wirth, 2000) as well as comparative content analysis
on other subjects or other types of media (Gerhards and Scha¨fer, 2006; Scha¨fer, 2007) and was
then supplemented inductively on the basis of our material.
7. All quotes from Arabic were translated by Ishtar Al-Jabiri.
8. Sympathy for the victims is conveyed on all channels by allowing their relatives to speak.
‘‘There was a huge flash, an explosion, a lot of smoke. The train stopped, as did the oncoming
train. There was lots of shouting’’ (ARD, 7 July 2005). ‘‘I found the whole room destroyed,’’
sobs this woman. ‘‘My two daughters lay on the ground – dead’’ (CNN, 10 November 2005).
‘‘Everyone was screaming, I was screaming, I thought I’m gonna die. It was horrific’’ (BBC, 8
July 2005). In addition, journalists describe the individual fates of victims: ‘‘Yvonne is
exhausted from the search;’ ‘‘Also killed on the number 30 bus was Phillip Russell;’ ‘‘Her boy-
friend phoned his office minutes before the blast to say he was on the bus [and] hasn’t been
heard of since’’ (BBC, 8 July 2005; 12 July 2005). They present people ‘‘in the search for their
relatives’’ (Al Jazeera, 8 July 2005) and their emotions (‘‘We will not give up hope on Laura;’
‘‘No firm news either for Rosenberg’s partner John. He has begun to mourn, to accept that she is
dead,’ BBC, 12 July 2005).
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